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Nietzsche, the Kantian Self, and Eternal Recurrence 
Philip J. Kain 
Santa Clara University 
 
Abstract 
Nietzsche's concept of the self grows out of Kant—and then attempts to subvert Kant.  
Nietzsche agrees that a unified subject is a necessary presupposition for ordered 
experience to be possible.  But instead of a Kantian unified self, Nietzsche develops a 
conception of the self of the sort that we have come to call postmodern.  He posits a 
composite bundle of drives that only become unified through organization.  This subject 
is unified, it is just that its unity is forged, constructed, brought about by domination.  But 
if the self is a bundle of struggling and shifting drives, how could it remain unified over 
time?  Nietzsche concept of the self requires his doctrine of eternal recurrence, which 
promises that I will remain the same, exactly and precisely the same, without slightest 




Nietzsche tells us that the world is chaos in that it lacks all order, arrangement, and form.1  
He speaks of a "formless unformulable world of the chaos of sensations…"2  He holds 
that reality is a "tremendous multiplicity."  It is a ceaseless flux of coming to be and 
passing away.3  Nothing remains the same, "what appears is always something new…"4  
"Every moment devours the preceding one…"5   
It is not the case, however, that chaos is found merely in the world outside.  If we turn 
within, we find chaos there too.6  We might say that we have a chaos facing a chaos, 
except that chaos is not the sort of thing that can be separated and individualized so 
neatly.  For Nietzsche, neither the ego nor the will are simple entities.  They are 
structures, nothing but complex multiplicities of sensations.  And the simplest sensation 
is something infinitely composite.  The notion of the ego as a simple unified entity is the 
result of interpretation—that is, simplification and falsification.7  Furthermore, Nietzsche 
repeatedly says that if there is no unified subject, then there can be no unified object.8  In 
this he is like Kant.   
Indeed, Nietzsche's entire epistemology and especially his concept of the self grow 
out of Kant.  But then, I will argue, Nietzsche pushes beyond Kant, subverts Kant’s 
conception of a unified self, and develops a conception of the self of the sort that we have 
come to call postmodern.  Nevertheless, a self capable of giving us organized experience, 
Kant convincingly shows, requires more unity than such a postmodern self can make 
possible.  On the other hand, Nietzsche’s doctrine of eternal recurrence, I will argue, can 
solve this problem.  It can explain the possibility of such unity without abandoning a 




Let us begin with Kant.  In the Transcendental Deduction of the first edition of the 
Critique of Pure Reason, Kant says:  "If each representation were completely foreign to 
every other, standing apart in isolation, no such thing as knowledge would ever arise.  For 
knowledge is [essentially] a whole in which representations stand compared and 
connected."9  For knowledge to be possible, the manifold of sensation must be run 
through and held together.  Coherent experience, Kant argues, requires a threefold 
synthesis:  a synthesis of apprehension in intuition, a synthesis of reproduction in 
imagination, and a synthesis of recognition in a concept.  These are not three separate 
steps; they are inseparable moments of one synthesis.  In the synthesis of apprehension, 
for Kant, the imagination takes up impressions, apprehends them, forms them into an 
image, and makes them modifications of the mind belonging to inner sense and thus 
subject to time.  Inner sense is thoroughgoingly temporal.  Our representations appear to 
us successively in time.  They are ordered, connected, and related in time.10 
 This synthesis of apprehension, however, cannot by itself give us ordered experience.  
A second synthesis is also necessary.  The mind must be able to reinstate preceding 
perceptions alongside subsequent ones and hold them together in a temporal series.  We 
need to retain, remember, and reproduce perceptions.  We need a synthesis of 
reproduction in imagination.11  If I try to "think of the time from one noon to another," 
Kant tells us, and "if I were always to drop out of thought the preceding 
representations…[if I] did not reproduce them while advancing to those that follow," 
then, he says, "not even the…most elementary representations…could arise."12  We must 
be aware that what we think is the same as what we thought a moment before.13  
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Otherwise we would have nothing but disjointed chaos.  We would not be able to connect 
earlier with later perceptions of an event or object—they would not belong together for 
us.  One sentence of a speech, even one word, since it would not be remembered, could 
not be connected with the next.  We would have no experience that we would call 
experience. 
 Still, even this is not enough.  Representations, if they are to give rise to knowledge, 
cannot be reproduced in any old order.  The reproduction, Kant thinks, must conform to a 
rule according to which a perception is connected with some one representation rather 
than another.14  The concepts or categories of the understanding provide these rules—
rules for the necessary reproduction of the manifold.15  A third synthesis, then, is also 
necessary.  A synthesis of recognition in a concept is necessary to determine the specific 
order and relation of the reproduction of representations.  The only way to grasp these 
successive and remembered moments in one cognition and the only way to unify these 
sensations into one object is through concepts that embrace, organize, and unify them.  
Without these concepts we would not have an object, but merely a disjointed series of 
isolated, remembered sensations. 
 Furthermore, this threefold synthesis requires a unity of consciousness—Kant calls it 
the transcendental unity of apperception.16  For Hume, there was no fixed, stable, unified 
self that could be experienced.  When we turn to inner sense, we experience nothing but a 
flux of shifting and changing ideas, images, impressions, feelings, and so forth.17  Kant 
agrees with Hume that we never experience a unified self.18  But for Kant there must be a 
unified self.  If not, then the diverse multitude of sensations, the temporal flux that 
constitutes inner sense, would not belong to a single consciousness and thus could not 
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belong to me.  The flux must be unified within a single self for experience to be 
possible—or else this flux of images could not be my flux of images.  It could not be my 
experience.19  As Kant puts it in the second edition, it must be possible for an "I think" to 
accompany all my representations.20  If not, I would have no experience—"merely a blind 
play of representations, less even than a dream."21  
 At the very same time, there is also a second unity involved here—that of the object.  
For the manifold of sensations to be unified as one object, it is also the case that this 
manifold must be contained in a unified self.  If we cannot presuppose a transcendental 
unity of apperception, there is no way to understand the possibility of a unified object.  
The transcendental unity of apperception through the categories forms a unified object.  
Thus the transcendental unity of apperception is an objective condition of all experience.  
It is not merely a subjective condition that I require in order to have experience of an 
object.  It is an objective condition under which representations must stand in order to 
become an object for me.22  Representations for their part must be capable of association; 
they must have what Kant calls an affinity.  They must be able to enter the mind, conform 
to the unity of apperception, and be subject to the rules of the categories.23  
 This might all seem to be just a bizarre problem that idealists are stuck with and that 
other philosophers can avoid.  But that is not the case at all.  Kant, it is true, suggests that 
our experience is constructed out of unconnected elements.  This might seem to be an 
unacceptable view, but for it to be right, we must see, it need not at all be the case that 
things in themselves are unconnected.  Let us assume, as even a materialist or a realist 
might, that things are fully organized and connected independently of our perception.  
Nevertheless, we must still apprehend these things, and in doing so we would have to 
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organize and connect our various representations—whatever the character of the thing 
itself.   
Suppose a house exists before us.  We apprehend a foundation, walls, roof, chimney, 
windows, doors, and so forth.  Even if they are organized and connected in themselves as 
for the best realist, we must still organize and connect them in our apprehension, or for 
us there would only be disconnected chaos.  Each shingle on the roof, brick of the 
chimney, pane of the window, panel of the door—all the way down to the minutest 
aspects of the manifold of sensation—would have to be grasped in our apprehension, 
reproduced in memory, subsumed under concepts, and brought under the unity of 
apperception.  If not, we would have unconnected chaos.24  Our senses separate things.  
We apprehend the roof separately from the foundation; we can fail to remember one 
aspect of a perception as connected with preceding perceptions.  We must organize each 
of these representations in our inner experience—whatever the world in itself might be 
like.  A threefold synthesis and a transcendental unity of apperception are necessary 
presuppositions of any ordered experience—for any sort of theory of experience.  
Postmodern theorists have attacked the notion of a unified self.  I do not think, 
however, that they can get away with simply rejecting Kant’s notion of a unified self.  It 
is true that selves may have more than one identity they are torn between or undecided 
about.  They may also feel socially pressured toward a single identity as if it were 
supposed to be their essence and such that other parts of the self are denied, repressed, or 
marginalized.  We may even admit that the self is undermined and subverted by an 
unconscious.  Nevertheless, Kant convincingly shows us that there has to be enough unity 
in the first place for this self to have experience sufficiently organized to then go on to 
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say that it wavers between multiple identities, feels pressured toward one and 
marginalizes others, or is undermined by an unconscious.  We cannot dismiss Kant, 
though we can decide that things are more complicated than he thought they were. 
What follows from the Kantian notion of a unified self, for Nietzsche, is that if all 
connection, unity, and organization are dependent upon and constituted by a unified ego, 
then, if it turns out that the unity of this ego exists only as illusion, all organized objects 
too would only be illusions.  Objects might appear unified, but really there would be total 
absence of connection, unity, and organization in things—all would really be chaos.  This 
is Nietzsche's view—and I want to work toward showing that it is.  He says in Will to 
Power:  "If we give up the effective subject, we also give up the object…"25  Nietzsche 
agrees, I think, that a unified subject and a threefold synthesis (or something very close to 
it) are necessary presuppositions for ordered experience to be possible.26  Nevertheless, 
he thinks that a unified subject is a fiction and that the threefold synthesis falsifies reality.  
He says: 
If our "ego" is for us the sole being, after the model of which we fashion and 
understand all being:  very well!  Then there would be very much room to doubt 
whether what we have here is not a perspective illusion—an apparent unity that 
encloses everything like a horizon.27  
 
We need "unities" in order to be able to reckon:  that does not mean we must 
suppose that such unities exist.  We have borrowed the concept of unity from our 
"ego" concept—our oldest article of faith.  If we did not hold ourselves to be 
unities, we would never have formed the concept "thing."  Now, somewhat late, 
we are firmly convinced that our conception of the ego does not guarantee any 
actual unity.28 
 
Once we see that the subject is a fiction, much else follows.  Nietzsche says in Will to 
Power that it is only on the model of the subject that we have invented the reality of 
things and projected them into our experience.  If we no longer believe in this subject, 
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then belief will disappear in things.29 It will also disappear in causes which produce 
things.  In Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche tells us that while belief in the truth of 
causal judgments, or (to use Kant's language) synthetic a priori judgments, is necessary 
for the preservation of creatures like ourselves, nevertheless such judgments are "nothing 
but false judgments."30 
 
III 
We must also notice that forgetfulness plays a very central role in Nietzsche's 
epistemology.  In appropriating Kant's threefold synthesis, Nietzsche makes a very 
interesting addition.  Kant, we have seen, made memory central to the constitution of 
experience.  The mind must be able to reinstate preceding perceptions alongside 
subsequent ones and hold them together through time.  We must be aware that what we 
think is the same as what we thought a moment before.  Otherwise experience would 
dissolve into disjointed chaos.  Nietzsche too admits that such reproduction is 
necessary,31 but he thinks that memory alone is only part of the story.  We do not and 
cannot remember the myriad flux of sensations we are continually bombarded with.  We 
would be overwhelmed.  We must forget.  We must reduce and simplify—or all we 
would have is chaos.  As Nietzsche puts it: 
Imagine the extremest possible example of a man who did not possess the power 
of forgetting at all and who was thus condemned to see everywhere a state of 
becoming:  such a man would no longer believe in his own being, would no 
longer believe in himself, would see everything flowing asunder in moving points 
and would lose himself in this stream of becoming….it is altogether impossible to 
live at all without forgetting.32 
 
A unified self must be able to hold together all its experience.  Experience must 
appear to me as my experience.  If not, if things are too complex, if I were overwhelmed 
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by a chaos of sensations, if I could not unify the object, then I could not experience 
anything as my experience, and if I could not do that I would not be able to believe in 
myself.  After all, as Hume showed, we have no experience of the self.33  The most basic 
indication I can have of my self comes through the organization of experience as my 
experience.  If I fail to do that, if things are too complex, what indication would there be 
that there is a self behind the chaotic flux of inner experience?34  For the self to be sure of 
itself, it must reduce, simplify, forget enough so that it can construct the object as its 
experience. 
In fact, in the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche even makes forgetfulness the more 
basic faculty.  Memory, of course, is necessary for the moment to moment holding 
together and reproduction of perceptions, and longer term memory is also necessary for 
responsibility—the keeping of promises.  For the latter sort of memory to develop it must 
overcome our basic tendency to forgetfulness.  It is Nietzsche's view that overcoming 
forgetfulness is not easily accomplished.  It requires some doing.  A memory must 
actually be "burned" into human beings over a long period of time.35  This suggests that 
forgetfulness is the more powerful faculty. 
Moreover, Nietzsche thinks that forgetfulness is necessary even for memory itself to 
be possible:  "memory is possible only with a continual emphasizing of what is already 
familiar, experienced.—Before judgment occurs, the process of assimilation must already 
have taken place…"36  We must forget the new and different, we must reduce the chaotic 
multiplicity of becoming, we must assimilate, we must establish the familiar.  Until we 
do so, it is impossible to remember.   
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Nietzsche even thinks "there could be…no present, without forgetfulness."37  If 
nothing remains the same, if "what appears is always something new," if every "moment 
devours the preceding one,"38 if memory itself presupposes forgetfulness, then to hold a 
present out from the stream of becoming, to remember the present long enough for us to 
apprehend it, we must reduce and simplify, we must forget. 
Forgetfulness is also necessary as a part of the third moment of the threefold 
synthesis.  For Kant, the only way to grasp successive and remembered moments in one 
cognition and the only way to unify these sensations into one object is through concepts 
that organize and unify them.  But for such categorization to occur, Nietzsche insists, 
there must be identical cases.39  Since we are confronted with chaos, which hardly 
contains identical cases, we must again forget differences and exceptions.  We must 
reduce and simplify.  We must construct the identical.40  Nietzsche tells us that "what 
appears is always something new…", but we only include the new "to the extent that it is 
similar to the old…"41  We reproduce the image that we have produced many times 
before.  We do not register what is new and different.42 
 
IV 
Nietzsche's epistemology follows from Kant's.  To have ordered experience we must 
assume a unified self.  If there is no unified self, there can be no unified object, no 
subsumption under categories, no judgment, no thinking.  How, then, do we know there 
is a unified self?  We have no experiential evidence for it.  For neither Hume nor Kant 
can it be experienced.  There must be a unified self, Kant argues, because that is the only 
way to explain the possibility of organized experience.43  But, then, what if we were able 
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to offer an explanation of such experience without assuming a unified self?  What if we 
were able to offer a different explanation?  Then Kant's explanation would not be the only 
possible explanation—and his justification of a unified self would collapse.   
And, indeed, Nietzsche is able to give us an alternative explanation.  It is the case, for 
Nietzsche much as for Kant, that the manifold, the flux of experience, must be 
apprehended, reproduced, and categorized.  It has to be held together as my experience 
for it to be experience.  It must be possible for an "I think" to accompany all my 
representations.  But it is not the case that this requires the sort of unified self that Kant 
thought it did.44  Nietzsche argues:  
a thought comes when "it" wishes, and not when "I" wish, so that it is a 
falsification of the facts of the case to say that the subject "I" is the condition of 
the predicate "think."  It thinks; but that this "it" is precisely the famous old "ego" 
is, to put it mildly, only a supposition, an assertion, and assuredly not an 
"immediate certainty."….[A]nd perhaps some day we shall accustom ourselves, 
including the logicians, to get along without the little "it" (which is all that is left 
of the honest little old ego).45 
 
Nietzsche writes, "The subject:  this is the term for our belief in a unity underlying all 
the different impulses….'The subject' is the fiction that many similar states in us are the 
effect of one substratum…"46  For Nietzsche, this subject is a "fiction."47  The ego is a 
"fable."48  He suggests instead: 
The assumption of one single subject is perhaps unnecessary; perhaps it is just 
as permissible to assume a multiplicity of subjects, whose interaction and struggle 
is the basis of our thought and our consciousness in general?  A kind of 
aristocracy of "cells" in which dominion resides…My hypothesis:  The subject as 
multiplicity.49 
 
Instead of a unified self, Nietzsche wants to posit a composite bundle of drives that 
only become a self through organization.  He says:  "It is our needs that interpret the 
world; our drives and their For and Against.  Every drive is a kind of lust to rule; each 
 12 
one has its perspective that it would like to compel all the other drives to accept as a 
norm."50  We must envision the sphere of the subject as "constantly growing or 
decreasing, the center of the system constantly shifting; in cases where it cannot organize 
the appropriate mass, it breaks into two parts.  On the other hand, it can transform a 
weaker subject into its functionary without destroying it, and to a certain degree form a 
new unity with it."51  The best way to think of subjects, Nietzsche tells us, is "as regents 
at the head of a communality…"52 
Postmodern thinkers who reject the notion of a unified subject are correct in pointing 
out that individuals have many identities or personas.  Nevertheless, Kant has done a 
persuasive job of showing us that we cannot have the ordinary experience we do have 
without a unified self.  I must hold experience together from moment to moment or the 
chair I am about to sit on will not appear as the same chair.  I must retain and reproduce 
it.  And that means that I must remain unchanged.  I can have different identities, adopt 
different personas, play different roles, develop a different personality, but I must remain 
myself.  I cannot change into something else or some other self, or the chair would not be 
retained, reproduced, and remembered by me, thus would not by my experience, thus 
would not amount to experience, thus would not appear as a chair. 
Nevertheless, for Nietzsche as for Hume, we have no experience of a fixed self, 
certainly not of a transcendental self.  Kant merely insists that it is an assumption 
necessary to explain the possibility of organized experience.  But is it?  The self, I think 
we have to admit, must have a certain amount of unity for experience to hold together 
from moment to moment, but does the self need to be really unified, does it need to be 
unified in itself?  It certainly need not be a transcendental or noumenal self.  Wouldn't a 
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powerful drive dominating and organizing other drives, a regent at the head of a 
communality, give us plenty of unity, enough so that I am able to retain and reproduce 
the chair I am about to sit on as the same chair?  Wouldn't such a dominant drive give us 
a subject with sufficient unity, as Nietzsche puts it, to "comprehend enough of the 
calculable and constant for [us] to base a scheme of behavior on it."?53  Such a unified 
subject, for Nietzsche, would thus be much like the unified object, a multiplicity held 
together, organized, and dominated.  This subject is unified, it is just that its unity is 
forged, constructed, organized, brought about by domination. 
But is there enough unity here to satisfy Kant?  All we have, for Nietzsche, is a 
bundle of drives that have been ranked and organized.  Each drive, Kant would insist, is 
other, outside the rest of the drives, heteronomous.  How can we get an unified and 
autonomous self out of a bundle of heteronomous drives?  However we understand the 
subject, as the dominant drive, the regent, or as all the drives, the whole bundle, the self 
will be made up of heteronomous drives.  The "I" will be made up of elements either that 
are simply not me or that at least are other than parts of me.  If so, then how can I speak 
of an "I" that persists?  How can I say that I am and remain myself throughout my life if I 
am nothing but a bundle of struggling, shifting, and changing drives dominated and 
organized merely to one degree or another? 
For Nietzsche this is not a problem at all.  We do not need the sort of autonomous self 
Kant would try to convince us we need.  We were never able to experience such a self 
anyway.  Thus we do not know that it is there.  All we experience is a flux of drives, 
feelings, images, and so forth.  We do not experience a single, unified, autonomous self, 
and we do not actually experience any of our drives, feelings, or images as heteronomous 
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either.  We only infer their heteronomy from the fact that they would be outside an 
autonomous self—and we assume there must be an autonomous self.  But why make that 
assumption?  A regent at the head of a communality gives us all the unity we need. 
But still, Kant would insist, we have not explained how I can say that I am and 
remain myself throughout my life if I am just a bundle of struggling and shifting drives.  
The subject, as Nietzsche understands it, is nothing but a simplified and falsified flux of 
chaotic becoming.  There is no explanation for how it remains the same over long periods 
of time.  Regents, after all, can be can be weakened, forced to share power, even 
overthrown.  Kant insists that the only explanation possible requires the assumption of a 
unified transcendental self.  Nietzsche has an alternative explanation.  Nietzsche's 
doctrine of eternal recurrence will explain how the self remains the same.  But before we 
get to eternal recurrence, we should say just a bit about will to power, which is also 




Will to power is a theory designed to deal with chaos and to explain the possibility of a 
composite self.  It explains how, given that reality is chaos, the appearance of order is 
possible.  And it explains how a composite self can be formed and hold together through 
the consolidation of such order.   
Will to power, as Magnus points out, implies no transcendent unity lurking behind the 
world—as, for example, did Schopenhauer's conception of will.54  Nietzsche develops his 
doctrine of will to power as an alternative to traditional metaphysics.  There are no 
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substances, no things, no selves, no regularity, no laws—there are no unities in the 
traditional sense.  All is isolated.  Nevertheless, will to power asserts a radical principle 
of unity—a principle, however, compatible with chaos:  
My idea is that every specific body strives to become master over all space and to 
extend its force (—its will to power:) and to thrust back all that resists its 
extension.  But it continually encounters similar efforts on the part of other bodies 
and ends by coming to an arrangement ("union") with those of them that are 
sufficiently related to it:  Thus they then conspire together for power.  And the 
process goes on—55 
 
All "purposes," "aims," "meaning" are only modes of expression and 
metamorphoses of one will that is inherent in all events:  the will to power.56 
 
To view the world in terms of power, it generally seems helpful to break things down 
as far as possible and then try to understand how such elements combine to form 
complexes—that was certainly Hobbes's approach in Leviathan.  For Nietzsche, reality 
consists of dynamic centers of force—pure drives or affects—each of which is related to 
all others in struggle.  Each drive is a "kind of lust to rule," each "construes all the rest of 
the world from its own viewpoint, i.e., measures, feels, forms, according to its own 
force."  Each drive has a "perspective that it would like to compel all the other drives to 
accept as a norm."57    
Nietzsche rejects the traditional notion of a cause behind things.  A quantum of force 
is nothing other than precisely a driving, willing, or effecting.  There can be no separation 
into neat causes and effects, agents and results, doers and deeds.  There is nothing but the 
acting.  To posit a cause, agent, or doer is merely to project a fiction into the process 
much as the popular imagination separates lightening from its flash as if the former 
existed apart from and produced the latter.  The being behind the deed is a mere fiction 
added to the deed.58    
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For Nietzsche, there are no unified entities that are stable in themselves, merely 
changing configurations arising from the interaction and struggle of power quanta.  This 
model applies in nature, in society or culture, and in individual consciousness—or, given 
that there is considerable disagreement on this matter, one can at least find texts and 
commentators which suggest that it applies in each of these areas.59  Each configuration 
or structure seeks to discharge its strength and to reach its maximal power.  Increases in 
power result from struggle between structures.  One structure confronts another as an 
obstacle, overcomes it, and assimilates it.  One drive dominates and organizes others.  
Higher levels of power require higher organization.60  For Nietzsche, "the thinking that 
rises to consciousness is only the smallest part…—the most superficial and worst part…" 
of what goes on in us.61  In his view, "our intellect is only the blind instrument" of one 
drive or another.62 
 
VI 
Nietzsche embraces the doctrine of eternal recurrence for the first time in The Gay 
Science:  
The greatest weight.—What, if some day or night a demon were to steal after 
you into your loneliest loneliness and say to you: "This life as you now live it and 
have lived it, you will have to live once more and innumerable times more; and 
there will be nothing new in it, but every pain and every joy and every thought 
and sigh and everything unutterably small or great in your life will have to return 
to you, all in the same succession and sequence—even this spider and this 
moonlight between the trees, and even this moment and I myself.  The eternal 
hourglass of existence is turned upside down again and again, and you with it, 
speck of dust!" 
Would you not throw yourself down and gnash your teeth and curse the 
demon who spoke thus?  Or have you once experienced a tremendous moment 
when you would have answered him:  "You are a god and never have I heard 
anything more divine."  If this thought gained possession of you, it would change 
you as you are or perhaps crush you.  The question in each and every thing, "Do 
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you desire this once more and innumerable times more?" would lie upon your 
actions as the greatest weight.  Or how well disposed would you have to become 
to yourself and to life to crave nothing more fervently than this ultimate eternal 
confirmation and seal?63 
 
There is much that could be said about eternal recurrence that need not be rehearsed 
here.64  What we must see here is that if all things are chaos, if we have nothing but 
conflicting drives, each seeking to dominate, absorb, and channel the others, if there is no 
subject except as a regent at the head of a bundle of drives, if there is really no object and 
no cause behind things, if there is just chaos, well so what, what difference does it make?  
This is not a problem at all—if every single detail of our lives will return, over and over 
again eternally, in exactly the same way, with exactly the same meaning, without the 
slightest change.65  Eternal recurrence allows chaos to remain chaos and will to power the 
configuration of chaos, yet provides us the highest possible order—eternal order.   
If I am just a bundle of struggling and shifting drives, how can I hold that I am and 
remain myself over time?  If the subject is nothing but simplified and falsified chaos, how 
can we explain how it remains the same throughout its life?  Eternal recurrence promises 
that I will remain the same, exactly and precisely the same, without the change of the 
slightest detail, not merely throughout this life, but for an eternity of lives, indeed, that I 
have already done so through an eternity of past lives.  Eternal recurrence provides the 
highest possible order.  Every image, every feeling, every representation, every detail of 
the temporal flux of inner sense is determined, is fated, is absolutely necessary, can be no 
other way than it is, and will repeat, has already repeated—for eternity.  The self, for 
Nietzsche, is not just a radically unstable postmodern self.  It is such a self, but it is not 
simply such a self.  It also has a stability, sameness, and unity that goes far beyond 
anything Kant ever imagined in his wildest dreams.66 
 18 
Is eternal recurrence a convincing doctrine?  That is something that can be discussed 
elsewhere.67  Here we need only see that to undermine Kant's argument for the necessity 
of a unified self, all we need is a possible alternative to such a self.  I do not think we can 
deny that Nietzsche has given us a possible alternative.  Kant claims that we must assume 
the existence of a unified transcendental self because that is the only way to explain the 
possibility of organized experience.  If another way to explain the possibility of 
organized experience can be suggested, then we have lost our reason for assuming the 
existence of a unified transcendental self.  While a postmodern conception of the self is in 
fact an alternative conception of the self, it alone gives us insufficient unity.  It cannot 
explain how the self remains sufficiently the same for it to organize experience over long 
periods of time as the experience of a single self.  I must remain myself.  I cannot change 
into something else or some other self or the object of my experience would not be 
retained, reproduced, and remembered by me, thus would not be my experience, thus 
would not amount to experience, thus would not remain the object before me.  But, on the 
other hand, a postmodern conception of the self together with a doctrine of eternal 
recurrence is quite capable of explaining how the self remains exactly and precisely the 
same.  Indeed, we might even say that the commitment to a postmodern conception of the 
self requires eternal recurrence if we are to be able to explain the possibility of organized 
experience over long periods of time.  At any rate, I do not see how we can deny that 
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